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Myths surrounding the MP-44 (aka Sturmgewehr 44)

1.6K views 12 replies 7 participants last post by  lysander  
#1 ·
There are two major myths surrounding the development of the Maschinenkarabiner 42, or MKb-42 and it successors, of which I too have been guilty of spreading. But, right now we are going to clear the slate and tell you the truth.

First myth – It’s a super submachine gun. No, it was never intended as a super submachine gun to counter the Soviets masses with PPSh-41s.

Second myth – Its requirements are based on experiences in the Eastern Front fighting the Soviets.

First let’s start with the ammunition, because you have to have the ammunition finalized before you can start to design a rifle to shoot it. The origins of the 7.9mm Kurz actually go all the way back to 1918, but serious development didn’t start until 1923, when the German Army quietly requested the ammunition industry develop a smaller cartridge to possibly replace the 7.9mm Mauser currently in use (quietly, because - treaty reasons). They received back several designs: RWS offered a 7mm x 46, DWM, a 7mm x 39.1, Geco, a 7.75mm x 39.5. The Army looked at them and wasn’t enthusiastic about changing the bore diameter or head diameter, so the Army, with assistance of Polte Armaturen und Maschinenfabrik began development of a cartridge with a bore diameter nominally 8mm and the same case head diameter as the Mauser cartridge. In mid-1938 the design was finalized as the 7.9mm x 33 Kurzpatrone. That year the Army issued a requirement for a new weapon to use this ammunition. The requirements were:

  • Shorter than the Kar 98k (unspecified as to how much shorter)
  • Weight to be less that, or equal to the weight of a fully loaded Kar 98k
  • Be capable of both semi- and full automatic fire
  • Have a rate of fire of 450 RPM
  • Accurate to a range of 400 meters
  • Be able to fire a standard rifle grenade with an appropriate adapter, and
  • 50 prototypes required to be delivered by early 1942 for testing

So, we can see the impossibility of the idea of the MKb-42/MP-44/StG-44 was the result of anything that happened during the invasion of the Soviet Union. All of the features that define the MP-44 were set down four years before German troops crossed the frontier into Russia.

So, if it wasn’t from Russia, where did these requirements come from?

For the answer to that we must look at what the German Army learned from World War I. There are many documents detailing all things the German Army had learned during the conflict. The biggest were: (and are in stark contrast to what the British and French learned)

Trench warfare was an anomaly and is to be avoided in the future. Maintain mobility at all costs in both offense and defense.

The key to success is to be mobile and use maneuver rather than brute force to defeat an enemy.

The second thing the Germans learned was:

The machine gun is the key weapon of the infantry.

The machine gun must be light enough to maintain mobility, and be powerful enough so that the firepower of the squad can be based on it.

The first order of business was to develop new tactics around this concept, so the MG 13 was used as a surrogate light machine gun until one could be developed, and in 1934 they introduced the MG-34, the first universal, or general purpose machine gun. The next order of business would have been to modernize the infantry rifle, which we saw happening earlier.
 
#2 · (Edited)
Doctrine dictates the direction of development.

The Germans felt rifle fire was only be used to support the machine gun. This is evident when you look at the doctrine for small units in the offense. As the Germans saw it, all offensive action the same, whether it be contact or deliberate. The assaulting platoon (or squad) would infiltrate forward using cover and concealment, while the next higher echelon would provide covering fire with their assigned heavy weapons. The assault element was to be as “invisible” to the enemy on the objective as possible, so they would not fire as they moved forward. The supporting heavy machine guns would bound forward maintaining suppressive fire on the objective. When the supporting weapons could no longer move forward, the assault element should be as close as possible to the objective and still be hidden. Then on the initiation of the assault, the supporting weapons would shift fire to isolate the intended penetration point and the assault element would rush, or bound as the situation dictated forward, only now opening fire on the objective. The move forward would be done as quickly as possible to secure the point of penetration, and seize the objective.

So, by doctrine, individual rifle fire is only used in the final stage of the assault, and that will most likely be well inside of 400 meters. As you can see the requirements of 1938 are a good fit for this intended assault scenario.

In the defense, the doctrine is much more complicated to explain without getting into a long description, so I will just say that it, like the offense, is based on extensive use of the machine gun with interlocking fields of fire, and small “trip-wire” combat outposts to alert the machine guns where the threatened section of the line is, and the counter-attack.

To further show the heavy reliance on the machine gun, we can look at the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for the German army and how it changed as the war progressed.

Before the invasion of Poland in 1939, these are the number and type of weapons assigned to an infantry battalion: (This does not show how the battalion was organized, as it is not strictly pertinent, however, if you want to see them I can show them)

Prior to the invasion of Poland circa 1938:

270 - rifles*
27 - light machine guns (MG-34s)
8 - heavy machine guns (MG-34s with tripods)
9 - 50mm mortars
6 - 81mm mortars

After Poland, there were a few changes required, mainly reorganizing the infantry platoon which resulted is a slight change to the weapons count:

216 - rifles*
27 - light machine guns
8 - heavy machine guns
9 - 50mm mortars (these were later phased out and the platoon mortar section removed, replaced by more extensive use of the rifle grenade)
6 - 81mm mortars

By 1944, this is what they wanted the battalion to have, granted this is what was assigned on paper, not what was actually in the field:

189 - rifles*
43 - light machine guns (MG-34s or MG-42s)
12 - heavy machine guns (MG-34s or MG-42s with tripods)
6 - 81mm mortars
4 - 120mm mortars

Note that this shows a 30% drop in active rifles, while a 60% and 50% increase in light and heavy machine guns.

To the German Army, the individual rifleman was there only to support and protect the machine gun, and the machine gun consumed lots of ammunition. A smaller, less effective rifle cartridge was an acceptable compromise if it allowed more full power machine gun ammunition to be carried.

And, in a way it could have simplified logistics, ALL 7.9mm Mauser could be supplied linked and ALL 7.9mm Kurz could be supplied loose (or in clips).

So, we can see that the Germans came up with the maximum rifle range from a completely different direction than the US, and it seems a bit more logical that the “well, you can only see 300 yards, so why bother with anything further . . .” I don’t know if I totally agree with the idea that the rifle is only used to support the machine gun, rather than the other way around, as this doctrine ties subordinate units to the next echelon up for fire support, but it is a viable doctrine.

(Some things that seem to be more or less true are the switch from “Maschinenkarabiner” to “Maschinenpistole”, which was done to deceive Hitler who felt that a new class of weapons was frivolous (which was in a way true, but frivolous projects seem the norm for the National Socialists), and the switch in naming MP-43 to MP-44, and later the StG-44; the stories surrounding them are also likely.)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

* This is the total number of active rifles those in the hands of men assigned to rifle squads, it does not include all the other rifles issued to people whose primary job is something other than shooting at the enemy, ie, company clerks, mess and supply personnel, officers and NCOs, etc.
 
#4 ·
An interesting comparison of the 1944 German infantry battalion to the US infantry battalion, as organized just after D-Day:

German 1944 infantry battalion (from above):
189 - rifles (Kar 98k)
43 - light machine guns (MG-34s or MG-42s)
12 - heavy machine guns (MG-34s or MG-42s with tripods)
6 - 8cm mortars (8 cm GrW 34)
4 - 12cm mortars (12 cm GrW 42)


US 1944 infantry battalion:
297 - rifles (M1 Garand)
31 - automatic rifles (M1918 BAR)
6 - medium machine guns (M1919A4)
8 - heavy machine guns (M1917s, or M1919s)
9 - 60mm mortars (M2)
6 - 81mm mortars (M1)
9 - 2.36 inch rocket launchers (M1, M1A1, M9, or M9A1)
1 - 57mm anti-tank gun (M1)

The US battalion is a bit more self sufficient in terms of heavy direct fire weapons. By the time of D-Day, an HE shell had been authorized for the 57mm. And the bazooka could be employed against light fortifications. However in machine guns (55 to 45) and mortars (81 and 120mm vs 60 and 81mm), the Germans have an advantage.

By the way, the US also came to the logical conclusion that the infantry battalion had to be very mobile, and addressed the problem in a typical American way - Lots and lots of trucks. By 1941 the US Army was completely motorized.
 
#6 · (Edited)
Not much to add, but their is some really good info and archival pictures re this topic in the book, The World’s Assault Rifles (2010), by Johnson and Nelson:
Image

Piederit’s obscure report during WWI on: ‘Advantages of Adopting an Intermediate Round’
Image

As noted by Lysander, by 1938 the requirements for a select fire rifle was pretty much understood:
Image

Serial #30 of the 1942 prototype (of 50 made). (No, the barrel is of course not bent, the page is just folding over in the book…)
Image
 
#7 ·
Adding to that, and this is probably heretical, the German 7.92x57 was standardized on a heavy bullet(196 - 198 gr bullet)for better down range performance and penetration. Again, for the machine gun. It's performance down range is actually better than the US M2 AP ammo.

Thanks, Lysander.
 
#8 ·
I do not deny that the idea of an assault rifle predated WWII. However, I firmly believe that its detailed development and adoption were a direct result of WWII combat operations. Even in support of machine guns, bolt action rifles were an inferior choice. I am sure that fact became entirely obvious especially on the Eastern Front.
 
#13 ·
Hitler was very well versed in the detailed minutiae of military equipment. He knew the effective ranges, and penetration capabilities of both foreign and domestic weapons, speeds of tanks, etc. This is why he could micromanage weapon development. Roosevelt and Churchill had no idea how much armor a German 75mm could penetrate, so could make no suggestions on how thick a new tank's armor should be, and so kept their noses out of it for the most part.

However, he was deficient in knowledge on army doctrine, ie, how the army is taught to fight. So, things like why the German army didn't need the Kar 98k as noted earlier, or why a Panther would have been better with just 65mm of frontal armor where lost on him.

How you intend to fight should drive your equipment requirements.
 
#11 ·
Apparently, development continued under the "MP - Machine Pistol" designation to disguise the ongoing project and keep the true intention hidden from Hitler, who, as mentioned, did not approve of it.

Kind of a gutsy move, considering he had prohibited further development.

After hearing of its effectiveness from frontline soldiers, he supposedly, eventually, approved of the design and coined the term "Sturmgewehr" - Storm Rifle - for it. That's how it became the STG-44.

That's how I've heard it, anyway.
 
#12 · (Edited)
Going back to why the US never fully embraced the "intermediate cartridge" idea goes back to doctrine. US doctrine called for establishing fire superiority before moving the assault element forward, so all available weapons were required to be engaged, not just the machine guns. A major reason for this requirement was the the US was (and still is) casualty averse, a byproduct of a citizen army. By establishing fire superiority first the advance of the assault element is far less likely to suffer major casualties.

The second reason was the expected knowledge and experience available to the junior officers and NCOs. The rapid build up and limited training resulted on a reliance on "cookbook" tactics, a set of simple rules for various generic situations to tell junior leaders what to do. The Germans did not do this, rather leaving the second lieutenants and sergeants to "figure it out" on their own, based on the actual situation and resources at hand.

Generally speaking, the German method is superior, provided you have well trained and motivated junior leaders. Unfortunately for the Germans, these became a scarce resource in the later stages of the war.