[Random Guy]

It doesn’t really matter because all engagements going back to World War I that have been documented are under 300 yards, with the exception of maybe the mountains of Afghanistan.

Actually, it was the mountains of Afghanistan and the open expanses of Iraq that generated a U.S. Army report (correction thesis) in 2009 that noted the following about engagement distances:
-M4 Carbine with M855 has an effective range of 300 meters.
-Our enemies understood that range limitation.
-Our enemies therefore would shoot at us with weapons that have ranges that exceed 300 meters, often using Russian light machine guns (7.62x54r) at a distance of half a kilometer away or more.
-This situation required more firepower than an M4 w/ M855. The US Army needed each deployed Squad with a SDM rifle with a 600 meter effective range. The Army report was called “Taking back the Half Kilometer” or something along those lines.

Outcome? The quick program at Rock Island Arsenal to make 6200 M14 based EBR-RI rifles circa 2009-2012. Then qualified soliders were trained as Squad Designated Marksmen, and how to use the EBRs effectively out to 600 meters. Sometimes this training also included an evening on the range where night vison scopes were used. These EBR-RIs were then sent to Afghanistan as our stop-gap 7.62x51mm SDM rifle.

This was always a stop-gap program to meet urgent mission requirements, as M14s have not been produced since 1964, and thus were in a “non-procurable” status. The Army was also very dissatisfied with the M249 squad machine gun and it’s poor performance w/ M855 ammo. Something with longer range, more accuracy, and energy was desperately needed.

So an upgrade was needed on both platforms based on the hard lessons learned in Afghanistan and to some extent Iraq. So a new RFP was developed after the conflict wound down. (Pasting below what I wrote 6 months ago re this topic).

So, the genesis of the Next Generation SQUAD Weapon (NGSW) contract/program was built around a new light machine gun that could defeat modern body armor. There was dissatisfaction with the M249 as a Squad Automatic weapon in Afghanistan and Iraq. That light machine gun in 5.56 had poor range, poor accuracy, and poor penetration capabilities. So a new cartridge was designed to to provide the infantry squad's machine gunner with a 1200 meter capability for aimed fire, and also able to penetrate modern body armor of "peer or near peer" adversaries (ie, Russia and China).

So here was the 3 or 4 key requirements for industry:
-Light machine gun with 1200 meter effective range.
-Infantry rifle with 600 meter effective range
-6.8mm cartridge that defeats “peer and near peer” body armor at extended ranges - but no longer than a 308W cartridge (ie, 2.800” length).
-Sound suppression capability.
(Note: A separate RFP and contract awarded for the unique optic systems for both platforms)

The biggest challenge for the industry was the first requirement re 1200 meter effective range - with a 6.8mm cartridge no longer or heavier than 7.62x51mm NATO. This effective range required a 3k velocity out of a short barrel - and thus extreme pressure levels that a traditional brass case can not handle - so industry developed innovative case designs.

People seem to think the program was only about a new infantry rifle, but that was seemingly secondary - what is primary was giving the machine gunner something more lethal than the M249, but not as heavy as the 27-pound M240 (aka "The Pig" as it is referred to in the military).

The XM250 (now M250) on top is what the US Army wanted as the main course, and the little XM5 (now M7) as the appetizer - a better platform than the M4 Carbine that can use the same 6.8x51mm ammo - both the standard pressure and high-pressure ammo will work with each system. But most training on the M7 will be the standard pressure ammo. Not sure about the M250, but I'd guess the full pressure ammo would be used for qualification given the range requirements. The innovative optic systems are shown below:

Most of the Army will still be using the M4A1, M249, and M240B (in 7.62X51mm NATO) for the foreseeable future. The XM5/XM7 in 6.8X51mm is (at least initially) only going to be issued to the cool guys. If you read the article cited, the initial contract only allows for 250K rifles, max - with the provision that some of those could go to the USMC if they're interested. Eventually, they may issue an M7 to everyone in the Army, but not initially.

A decision by June 30th, 2023 will reportedly determine if the rifle will go into mass production. The only thing that could change that is if US Army finds fundamental flaw(s) with the either the M7, M250, 6.5x51mm ammo, or the two optic systems. So June 30th is the last "go" versus "no-go" decision point. It's not a Special Forces rifle - it's the formal replacement for the M4 Carbine for anyone who might be in a 'trigger puller' MOS.

The main logistical thing that will delay the roll-out to ALL US Army infantry troops is the requirement for enough ammunition supply needed for training and deployment purposes, and that is why Lake City is building an entirely new building to exclusively produce the 6.8x51mm ammo - capable of making millions of rounds per year by the year 2026. Appears to be a done deal at this point - unless some fatal flaw was discovered this summer, at the end of the IOT&E period – Initial Operational Test and Evaluation period.

Folks should really watch the last 7 minutes of this video (starting at minute 28:00 if you don't have time for the full video) - it will quickly dispel with a lot of the misinformation out there:

The fundamental shift in US military thinking is that we are choosing to use a machine gun cartridge for the basic infantry rifle. 55 years ago we made the decision to go with the small caliber (5.56mm) infantry rifle and go away from the full-power machine gun round of the M14. Again, the high pressure 6.8x51mm cartridge was designed first and foremost as a 1200 meter capable light machine gun round, and it will render both the M249 and M240 obsolete. (Although the Army has released a contract for vendors to convert the legacy M240s to the new 6.8x51mm round).

The military decided that the standard pressure 6.8x51mm round will be the new infantry standard, and in combat the high-pressure round will be issued that will easily defeat modern body armor of "peer or near peer" military forces (ie, Russia and China). That round will double the effective range of the standard infantry rifle. Note: the M4 Carbine w/ M855 ammo has a 300 meter effective range, but the new M7 (formerly M5) has a 600 meter effective range, and given its an effectively sound suppressed rifle, marksmanship scores will likely go up considerably.

Contract info:
120,000 – Soldiers in the Army’s active (COMPO 1) and reserve (COMPO 2) close combat force– identified as infantrymen, cavalry scouts, combat engineers, medics, special operations, and forward observers– who will use the NGSW platforms. Army spokesmen this week said other units and specialties will continue to use legacy small arms. “For example, the company supply sergeant will continue to carry M-4 or another weapon, not the Next-Gen Weapon.”

250,000 – Current ceiling of NGSWs in the contract. With that being said, the Army stated this week the current thinking is to field 107,000 M5 rifles and 13,000 M250 machine guns initially, roughly an 8:1 ratio.

....so basically everyone who is a potential 'trigger puller' will have one of the M7s in the years a head, but not the supply clerks or admin staff who will presumably never be a trigger-puller in combat.

Bottom-line: The high-pressure 6.8x51mm was - and is - designed as a machine gun cartridge that out performs the 7.62 NATO, and the standard pressure 6.8x51mm will work well in the M7 infantry rifle out to 600 meters as required. In the case of war, both systems can use the high-pressure ammo - and its a good thing both rifles have effective suppressors, as 80k PSI cartridge would produce A LOT of muzzle blast without a suppressor.

As noted by Ian McCollum in that video, he thinks US Army machine gunners are going to love the new M250, and I suspect he is right about that... As for the legacy "Pigs" (aka M240), the Army wants a vendor to re-engineer and offer a conversion kit for the 6.8x51mm. The biggest issue I see with the new cartridge is the lack of NATO adoption.

 

[Random Guy]

You cannot compare M14 production to anything as it was budget constrained to 3,000 rifles per month, per contractor.

I’ve not read that. Maybe that applies to only the first year contract from FY1959? (Exactly 35,003 were ordered for H&R and WRA). Clearly by FY1960 the military was ordering more the 36k rifles per contractor, and from 1961-63 they were making well in excess of 3k per month. Here’s the order vs production data:

 

[milprileb]

Up Front: Used both M14 and M16 in jungles. I have engaged NVA with full chest rig of magazines and NO...that did not any provide NVA a ballistic protection from my fires. And NO, I never sprayed my M16A1 (initially issued a XM16E1 mind you) and shot semi auto. In 1980's when M16A2 came about we got a upgraded rifle with far better barrel, better ammo and far better sights. It was welcomed .

At the time of VN War, being a dog face gravel agitating, prime mover of the XM 16E1, then M16A1 and later XM177E1, these weapons never failed to operate for me as an Infantryman. What I would have preferred but was not able to make happened was a M14 with chopped down barrel and that was because I never was in the rear areas where I could find a M14 and get t hat done. That said, I used what was issued and the limitations of such weaponry.

A shorter M14 in .243 Win would have been ideal but dreams of such in my mind during my time in RVN were day dreams of what might be...and M1A's later evolved this way under SAI manufacture.

All the good research done in this thread is academic, after the fact and only proves how Army R&D lost control and by the way that small arms acquisition program is still going no where...we've been promised a new battle rifle since 2008 in the Army and no cigar yet to the field. Marines gave up on Army and went in early 2008 to HK platform and have a new rifle albeit still 556 caliber.

I am not a proponent of 556 nor AR15, although piston system AR's are the obvious end state for the AR platform. 556 has limitation even with 77 gr ammo (far better than 55 gr).

Myths: 18 or 28 in a mag is about as valid as the Army put salt peter in our chow to limit sexual drives of soldiers. Fact: issue of mags is abuse and non maintenance and use of cruddy ammo. Keep ammo and mags clean and inspect for any issues, keep weapon clean and operational , then performance of mag, ammo and weapon (any weapon) will serve you well.

By the way, the other myth of that era was if you got the "black syph", there was no cure, you were put on an island off Viet Nam and that was all folks, so don't forget to take prevention seriously on R&R and always load 18 in a 20 rd mag or 28 in a 30 rd mag. Keep faith in all myths and rumors and if you don't hear one today by 0900,, take charge and issue one your self.

I found the M14 too long in jungles and M16 far more effective in jungles.

The only time I know my rounds deflected was in U Minh Forest , IV Corps, Mekong Delta where green bamboo could be 4 to 6 inches thick (diameter) and it was defeating 556 and even our M60's with 762 had a rough go shooting thru that stuff. The other guys weapons no better by the way. Casualties happened though on both sides so a fight is a fight.

I'd rather argue M1A Scout vs AK 47 and if I could turn the time machine back, I'd put my pay check on the Scout out matching the AK47. However M16 vs AK47 was a near match that , in my view, favored the AK47 for absolute trustworthiness and a better caliber for Viet Nam conditions. However the M16 with lesser caliber was adequate but not superior in all regards. As said , all flavors of M16 ever issued to me in RVN and later years always worked and never failed me but never was I ever demented to believe it was the "Best" rifle American ought to be armed with.

There were times in Afghanistan & Iraq that the distances defeated the M4 and 556 caliber and I so wanted a M14 or a M1 rifle to reach effectively at 600 meters or farther. The SAW didn't hack it at those ranges either, the PKM of the other guy was what worked !!!

One shot at SLAM Marshall limited
"survey" in Europe in WWII...No Cigar !!! . In VN War, Afghanistan nor Iraq, I never saw, heard or know about soldiers or Marines not firing their weapons. Come to think of it SLAM Marshall, you never asked USMC if Marines fired their rifles in the Pacific nor US Army in Pacific nor Italy. My experience is soldiers shoot, they have a vote and they vote in a fire fight. Oh yes they do. We fight , we are not neutered and need a safe space to hid !!

Well, besides the comments above, I don't have an opinion whatsoever to jot down.

 

[lysander]

I’ve not read that. Maybe that applies to only the first year contract from FY1959? (Exactly 35,003 were ordered for H&R and WRA). Clearly by FY1960 the military was ordering more the 36k rifles per contractor, and from 1961-63 they were making well in excess of 3k per month. Here’s the order vs production data:

I misread my source, it was Springfield that was manpower limited by budget to 3,000 per month.

 

[TXPI]

They have low pressure 6.8 x 51 rounds that they train with in addition to the high pressure 80,000 pounds per square inch rounds. If they use the high pressure rounds a lot the barrels will likely be shot out within 2,500 rounds or less on the M-7.

Great, so now we’re going to adopt a rifle with two different cartridges based solely on pressure, and keep another platform and caliber in the system as well, being the M16/5.56. This is beyond stupid. Brilliant idea. There should only be one rifle cartridge, and you should train how you shoot. You don’t use low pressure ammo in training and then go and use a much higher pressure round in combat that performs differently. This is a recipe for disaster. Train like you fight and fight like you train.

 

[TXPI]

How was the M16A2 a dumpster fire?

Uh, for the reasons I clearly listed in the post……. The whole M16 program has been a farce. It’s a varmint cartridge. People have died because of the adoption of it, it’s gotten progressively heavier and the ammunition and performance worse over the years and they are finally seeing the light and going away from it hopefully, but the new platform is laughable at best. Amazing how many people will try and legitimize and accept mediocrity and/or outright poor performance when it comes to a firearm and it’s ammunition, as has been done with the M16 series.

 

[lysander]

"survey" in Europe in WWII...No Cigar !!! . In VN War, Afghanistan nor Iraq, I never saw, heard or know about soldiers or Marines not firing their weapons. Come to think of it SLAM Marshall, you never asked USMC if Marines fired their rifles in the Pacific nor US Army in Pacific nor Italy. My experience is soldiers shoot, they have a vote and they vote in a fire fight. Oh yes they do. We fight , we are not neutered and need a safe space to hid !!

So, you shoot. All the time, every time?

Even if if the situation is outside the ROE? (Rules, we don't need no stinkin' rules.)

Even if you were ordered "Don't open fire until you get permission?" (Orders, who bothers with obeying orders.)

Even if you cannot see where the enemy is? (Spray and pray, we don't care about wasting ammunition.)

Even if you are under such intense suppressive fire that putting your head around the cover you are behind would mean getting a hole in it? (Hey, I'm bullet-proof.)

Even when you move in a rush from cover to cover? (I'm Rambo, dammit!)

Have you read "Men Against Fire"? What was the aim of his quoting that statistic? Was the statistic intended to be an exact number calculated to the nth decimal point? What was the point of the essay?

The quoting of that statistic: "What percent on solders shoot during an engagement?" has grown into it own little world far removed from the context it was originally placed. The point he was making was that in fire fights, a percentage of troops, (and in his opinion, a disturbingly large percent) did not shoot their weapons because:

a) They were waiting for orders to open fire,
b) They did not know what they supposed to shoot at.
c) They were suppressed.

These reasons have nothing to do with a willingness to fight, or being cowards, It has to do with training and effective command and control at the squad and platoon level. A 13 man squad is difficult to control with only one squad leader, most of his attention is going to be with directing the squad automatic, and coupled with the fact that men furthest away from where the leader is at the moment are going to find it difficult if not impossible to see or hear his commands.

The platoon and squad needed to be organized so that the leaders can effectively control their men and properly direct their fire, and the men need to be trained so that in the absence of direct control by leadership, they know what they are supposed to do.

 

[KurtC]

For generations, the Army has been developing rifles to fight the previous war, not the next one.

The M1903 was designed to refight the Spanish-American War.
The Garand was designed to refight WWI.
The M14 was designed to refight WWII and Korea.


The one redeeming quality of WWII weaponry was that the Army realized that different jobs require different weapons. Hence, we had Service Rifles, Automatic Rifles, Carbines and Sub-Machine Guns.

McNamara and the other wiz kids tried the One-Size-Fits-All approach to the military, including uniforms, boots, aircraft and firearms. The idea that the M14 could replace all the shoulder arms currently in service was a death blow to the platform.

 

[TXPI]

For generations, the Army has been developing rifles to fight the previous war, not the next one.

The M1903 was designed to refight the Spanish-American War.
The Garand was designed to refight WWI.
The M14 was designed to refight WWII and Korea.


The one redeeming quality of WWII weaponry was that the Army realized that different jobs require different weapons. Hence, we had Service Rifles, Automatic Rifles, Carbines and Sub-Machine Guns.

McNamara and the other wiz kids tried the One-Size-Fits-All approach to the military, including uniforms, boots, aircraft and firearms. The idea that the M14 could replace all the shoulder arms currently in service was a death blow to the platform.

Very true, but I think it did a lot better jobs than it was given credit for.

 

[Ted Brown]

The weapon I was trained on in my first Air Force hitch was the M1 Carbine. I still really like that gun. I qualified with the M16A1 during much of my career in the Air National Guard, but I also shot the M14 on the rifle team. I've concluded that all the weapons used in the military are good when used within their limitations. Some I like better than others, but I can find a use for all of them.

 

[TXPI]

The weapon I was trained on in my first Air Force hitch was the M1 Carbine. I still really like that gun. I qualified with the M16A1 during much of my career in the Air National Guard, but I also shot the M14 on the rifle team. I've concluded that all the weapons used in the military are good when used within their limitations. Some I like better than others, but I can find a use for all of them.

Well, I will say this- I don’t know of any other platform in the US military that was so problem plagued at the beginning that it got troops killed because it wouldn’t function right. That honor rests solely with the M-16.

 

[milprileb]

So, you shoot. All the time, every time?

Even if if the situation is outside the ROE? (Rules, we don't need no stinkin' rules.)

Even if you were ordered "Don't open fire until you get permission?" (Orders, who bothers with obeying orders.)

Even if you cannot see where the enemy is? (Spray and pray, we don't care about wasting ammunition.)

Even if you are under such intense suppressive fire that putting your head around the cover you are behind would mean getting a hole in it? (Hey, I'm bullet-proof.)

Even when you move in a rush from cover to cover? (I'm Rambo, dammit!)

Have you read "Men Against Fire"? What was the aim of his quoting that statistic? Was the statistic intended to be an exact number calculated to the nth decimal point? What was the point of the essay?

The quoting of that statistic: "What percent on solders shoot during an engagement?" has grown into it own little world far removed from the context it was originally placed. The point he was making was that in fire fights, a percentage of troops, (and in his opinion, a disturbingly large percent) did not shoot their weapons because:

a) They were waiting for orders to open fire,
b) They did not know what they supposed to shoot at.
c) They were suppressed.

These reasons have nothing to do with a willingness to fight, or being cowards, It has to do with training and effective command and control at the squad and platoon level. A 13 man squad is difficult to control with only one squad leader, most of his attention is going to be with directing the squad automatic, and coupled with the fact that men furthest away from where the leader is at the moment are going to find it difficult if not impossible to see or hear his commands.

The platoon and squad needed to be organized so that the leaders can effectively control their men and properly direct their fire, and the men need to be trained so that in the absence of direct control by leadership, they know what they are supposed to do.

Wow, taking it over the top. I said nothing of violating ROE. Returning enemy fire is all I commented about. I think by your response, you owe me an apology and were you ever a Infantry Platoon or Company Commander i combat ...well, I was so I know my business really well Thank You Very Much. Oh, I forgot....Bless Your Heart for trying.

 

[TXPI]

I don’t think the M14 vs M16 was about “numbers” per se regarding weight of rifle or weight of ammo, etc - it was about whether or not the platform meets the military’s stated requirements. Eventually it was realized the M14 as an infantry solider’s machine gun didn’t meet the requirements as well as the M16. Controllability was key, and producibility /delays was also a factor, which I will explain below.

Long story short, Robert McNamara was frustrated with various M14 production delays and QA/QC problems, and presumably its lack of meeting the core requirement of an effective/ controllable select fire weapon - all of which led to the cancellation of that program in 1963 - esp given that the M16 was then seen as a suitable replacement.

Remember, the replacement for the M1 with a select fire rifle began way back in late 1944 when SA was ordered to make full-auto M1 Garand type rifles. This journey started with John Garand developing the T20E2 by mid-1945. Ten years later, a rigorous comparison between the T44 vs T48 was undertaken, which resulted in T44E4 being selected in May 1957. However, over two years later - no M14 rifles had been delivered until late 1959, when SA delivered its first batch to the military. Lots of reasons for this including labor and funding constraints, etc. Regardless, I think historically, 1960 was a fateful year.

In early testing at Ft Hood in 1960 there were some catastrophic failures of H&R M14s. I think one (or two?) soldier(s) were hurt when the M14 self-destructed. The entire M14 production process was immediately halted for three months, and a root cause analaysis was performed, with new / robust QA/QC processes developed for H&R and Winchester production of M14s. (TRW’s contract came later). Production resumed but some reputation damage was likely done in the process.

IIRC, it was also 1960 when Robert McNamara visited ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ at the border crossing between East and West Germany, considered to be the most dangerous potential ‘hot spot’ during the Cold War. To his dismay, the US troops there were still armed with old M1 Garands, and he was embarrassed at the pictures of our troops still armed with that WW2 era weapon. Reportedly, McNamara ordered that US troops at that critical location be armed with the new M14s. There are indeed subsequent pictures of new M14s being inspected by troops in West Germany (all rifles had slotted handguards). Again, there was likely some reputation harm/embarrassment done to the M14 program, based on what the reference books say.

By 1962 production had finally increased somewhat but still not high enough. It was also clear that the M14 was not controllable in full-auto mode, not even with the new M2 bipod and the “flipper” buttplate, and this was the core requirement of the program going back to 1945 when the US military ordered SA to build a select fire version of the M1 for the upcoming invasion of Japan. By 1963 the M14's "controllability issue" led to the development of what became the M14E2 and later M14A1 rifle, but I don’t think the US Army or it’s civilian leadership were likely happy about the “controllability” issue that was apparent. So as of 1962, a full 17 years after the end of WW2, and 5 years since the M14 had been formally adopted - the US had still not equipped the bulk of its U.S. Army and Marine Corps with a select fire infantry rifle. Recruits were still being trained on M1 Garands. This fact was frustrating DoD leadership - and even Congress had hearings on why the M14 program was plagued with production delays.

At this time the overall commander of the US Air Force had famously tested the AR15 on a poor water melon (at a picnic I recall), showing that it was in fact quite controllable in full auto mode with the small 5.56mm cartridge. The Air Force ordered these new rifles from Colt as the M16…and that started a process to completely re-evaluate the M14 program. The famous General Curtis LeMay of the Air Force really wanted the AR-15/M16, and McNamara listened and had ARPA do an analysis based on General LeMay's praise of the little black rifle. The result was the Hitch Report of 1962, which stated the M16 was superior to the M14. (I won't argue the conclusions of that report, just stating what is in the historical record).

Bottomline: The M14 contact with the private sector was supposed to replace the US’s five million M1 Garands on a ‘one-for-one’ basis, presumably by the mid-1960s. However it was clear to DoD leadership and Congress by early 1963 that this was not going to happen - due to a host of issues outlined above. Moreover, the rifle was also not controllable in full auto fire by the average 150 pound Army recruit/solider. In contrast, the lighter M16 was controllable in full auto, and was also seen as a more “modern” or “space age” firearm. It was favorably compared to the Russian AK-47 (which was also controllable in full auto). The aluminum and plastic M16 was also easier to mass produce relative to the traditional “wood and steel” M14 (and complex manufacturing and heat treatment processes). Lastly, the 1962 Hitch report suggested the M16 was a better platform, and that was basically it for the M14.

So Robert McNamara decided to “cut his losses” and canceled the M14 program in 1963, with TRW delivering the last batch of 200 rifles to the US military in 1964. Only 1.3 million of the planned 5 million rifles were made. The M16 became the main focus and it was quickly procured and issued given the war in Vietnam. However, that haste resulted in some weapon and ammo issues in the field that tarnished its early reputation, so changes were made to address those issues. The rest is history, as they say.

That’s EXACTLY what the adoption of the M-16 was, a lighter weight rifle that in theory, you could carry more ammunition because of the lighter weight. That’s recorded history and fact.

 

[TXPI]

Actually, it was the mountains of Afghanistan and the open expanses of Iraq that generated a U.S. Army report in 2009 that noted the following about engagement distances:
-M4 Carbine with M855 has an effective range of 300 meters.
-Our enemies understood that range limitation.
-Our enemies therefore would shoot at us with weapons that have ranges that exceed 300 meters, often using Russian light machine guns (7.62x54r) at a distance of half a kilometer away or more.
-This situation required more firepower than an M4 w/ M855. The US Army needed each deployed Squad with a SDM rifle with a 600 meter effective range. The Army report was called “Taking back the Half Kilometer” or something along those lines.

Outcome? The quick program at Rock Island Arsenal to make 6200 M14 based EBR-RI rifles circa 2009-2012. Then qualified soliders were trained as Squad Designated Marksmen, and how to use the EBRs effectively out to 600 meters. Sometimes this training also included an evening on the range where night vison scopes were used. These EBR-RIs were then sent to Afghanistan as our stop-gap 7.62x51mm SDM rifle.

This was always a stop-gap program to meet urgent mission requirements, as M14s have not been produced since 1964, and thus were in a “non-procurable” status. The Army was also very dissatisfied with the M249 squad machine gun and it’s poor performance w/ M855 ammo. Something with longer range, more accuracy, and energy was desperately needed.

So an upgrade was needed on both platforms based on the hard lessons learned in Afghanistan and to some extent Iraq. So a new RFP was developed after the conflict wound down. (Pasting below what I wrote 6 months ago re this topic).

So, the genesis of the Next Generation SQUAD Weapon (NGSW) contract/program was built around a new light machine gun that could defeat modern body armor. There was dissatisfaction with the M249 as a Squad Automatic weapon in Afghanistan and Iraq. That light machine gun in 5.56 had poor range, poor accuracy, and poor penetration capabilities. So a new cartridge was designed to to provide the infantry squad's machine gunner with a 1200 meter capability for aimed fire, and also able to penetrate modern body armor of "peer or near peer" adversaries (ie, Russia and China).

So here was the 3 or 4 key requirements for industry:
-Light machine gun with 1200 meter effective range.
-Infantry rifle with 600 meter effective range
-6.8mm cartridge that defeats “peer and near peer” body armor at extended ranges
-Sound suppression capability.
(Note: A separate RFP and contract awarded for the unique optic systems for both platforms)

The biggest challenge for the industry was the first requirement re 1200 meter effective range - with a 6.8mm cartridge no longer or heavier than 7.62x51mm NATO. This effective range required a 3k velocity out of a short barrel - and thus extreme pressure levels that a traditional brass case can not handle - so industry developed innovative case designs.

People seem to think the program was only about a new infantry rifle, but that was seemingly secondary - what is primary was giving the machine gunner something more lethal than the M249, but not as heavy as the 27-pound M240 (aka "The Pig" as it is referred to in the military).

The XM250 (now M250) on top is what the US Army wanted as the main course, and the little XM5 (now M7) as the appetizer - a better platform than the M4 Carbine that can use the same 6.8x51mm ammo - both the standard pressure and high-pressure ammo will work with each system. But most training on the M7 will be the standard pressure ammo. Not sure about the M250, but I'd guess the full pressure ammo would be used for qualification given the range requirements. The innovative optic systems are shown below:
View attachment 525498


A decision by June 30th, 2023 will reportedly determine if the rifle will go into mass production. The only thing that could change that is if US Army finds fundamental flaw(s) with the either the M7, M250, 6.5x51mm ammo, or the two optic systems. So June 30th is the last "go" versus "no-go" decision point. It's not a Special Forces rifle - it's the formal replacement for the M4 Carbine for anyone who might be in a 'trigger puller' MOS.

The main logistical thing that will delay the roll-out to ALL US Army infantry troops is the requirement for enough ammunition supply needed for training and deployment purposes, and that is why Lake City is building an entirely new building to exclusively produce the 6.8x51mm ammo - capable of making millions of rounds per year by the year 2026. Appears to be a done deal at this point - unless some fatal flaw was discovered this summer, at the end of the IOT&E period – Initial Operational Test and Evaluation period.

Folks should really watch the last 7 minutes of this video (starting at minute 28:00 if you don't have time for the full video) - it will quickly dispel with a lot of the misinformation out there:

The fundamental shift in US military thinking is that we are choosing to use a machine gun cartridge for the basic infantry rifle. 55 years ago we made the decision to go with the small caliber (5.56mm) infantry rifle and go away from the full-power machine gun round of the M14. Again, the high pressure 6.8x51mm cartridge was designed first and foremost as a 1200 meter capable light machine gun round, and it will render both the M249 and M240 obsolete. (Although the Army has released a contract for vendors to convert the legacy M240s to the new 6.8x51mm round).

The military decided that the standard pressure 6.8x51mm round will be the new infantry standard, and in combat the high-pressure round will be issued that will easily defeat modern body armor of "peer or near peer" military forces (ie, Russia and China). That round will double the effective range of the standard infantry rifle. Note: the M4 Carbine w/ M855 ammo has a 300 meter effective range, but the new M7 (formerly M5) has a 600 meter effective range, and given its an effectively sound suppressed rifle, marksmanship scores will likely go up considerably.

Contract info:
120,000 – Soldiers in the Army’s active (COMPO 1) and reserve (COMPO 2) close combat force– identified as infantrymen, cavalry scouts, combat engineers, medics, special operations, and forward observers– who will use the NGSW platforms. Army spokesmen this week said other units and specialties will continue to use legacy small arms. “For example, the company supply sergeant will continue to carry M-4 or another weapon, not the Next-Gen Weapon.”

250,000 – Current ceiling of NGSWs in the contract. With that being said, the Army stated this week the current thinking is to field 107,000 M5 rifles and 13,000 M250 machine guns initially, roughly an 8:1 ratio.

....so basically everyone who is a potential 'trigger puller' will have one of the M7s in the years a head, but not the supply clerks or admin staff who will presumably never be a trigger-puller in combat.

Bottom-line: The high-pressure 6.8x51mm was - and is - designed as a machine gun cartridge that out performs the 7.62 NATO, and the standard pressure 6.8x51mm will work well in the M7 infantry rifle out to 600 meters as required. In the case of war, both systems can use the high-pressure ammo - and its a good thing both rifles have effective suppressors, as 80k PSI cartridge would produce A LOT of muzzle blast without a suppressor.

As noted by Ian McCollum in that video, he thinks US Army machine gunners are going to love the new M250, and I suspect he is right about that... As for the legacy "Pigs" (aka M240), the Army wants a vendor to re-engineer and offer a conversion kit for the 6.8x51mm. The biggest issue I see with the new cartridge is the lack of NATO adoption.

Actually in Afghanistan, it was shown that the M4 carbine with green tip ammo has an effective range of about 125m, not 300. Hence our troops being taught to shoot the bad guy six times to put them down. Ever heard of military guys being told to do that with an M14? Methinks not.

 

[Random Guy]

Here’s the Abstract to the 2009 Army report (correction: thesis) for anyone interested. 300 meters is generally consider by the US Army as the accepted effective range of the M4 Carbine. The SDM role at the Squad levand SDMR rifle were the apparent outcome:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA512331.pdf

“Not procurable” M14 based SDM circa 2009 to about 2016/17 (6200 were made)

Newly procurable G28-based US Army SDMR circa 2019/2020 to present day (I’ve read that 6k were ordered, as a one-for-one replacement of the old EBR-RI).

 

[TXPI]

Here’s the Abstract to the 2009 Army report for anyone interested. 300 meters is generally consider by the US Army as the accepted effective range of the M4 Carbine. The SDM role at the Squad levand SDMR rifle were the apparent outcome:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA512331.pdf

View attachment 525566
“Not procurable” M14 based SDM circa 2009 to about 2016/17:
View attachment 525567

Newly procurable G28-based US Army SDMR circa 2020 to present day:
View attachment 525568

That’s not what it says it all. You need to go back and carefully reread that. It says the most engagements were over 300m and a bullet is needed that will be effective to 500m. It’s says absolutely nothing about the lethality of the M4 carbine at any distance, as far as what you posted. When you click on that page, it does say some nonsense about it being effective to 200m, but the real number is more like 50m. Actually it says a better bullet needs to be come up with or go to something like a 6.5 or 6.8, which proves my point, the 5.56 is a worthless cartridge. This is why they are trying to go away from this cartridge and platform. Not sure where you’re getting this information from.

 

[TXPI]

Here’s the Abstract to the 2009 Army report for anyone interested. 300 meters is generally consider by the US Army as the accepted effective range of the M4 Carbine. The SDM role at the Squad levand SDMR rifle were the apparent outcome:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA512331.pdf

View attachment 525566
“Not procurable” M14 based SDM circa 2009 to about 2016/17:
View attachment 525567

Newly procurable G28-based US Army SDMR circa 2019/2020 to present day:
View attachment 525568

Actually, I stand corrected, from what I’m finding online, these are the real numbers. Studies are showing that the M855 being fired from the M4's have the highest potential for lethality at 50 meters and CQBR's at 30 meters. Kinda pathetic in my book. Just because big army claims a number, that does not always equate to reality.

 

[TXPI]

Up Front: Used both M14 and M16 in jungles. I have engaged NVA with full chest rig of magazines and NO...that did not any provide NVA a ballistic protection from my fires. And NO, I never sprayed my M16A1 (initially issued a XM16E1 mind you) and shot semi auto. In 1980's when M16A2 came about we got a upgraded rifle with far better barrel, better ammo and far better sights. It was welcomed .

At the time of VN War, being a dog face gravel agitating, prime mover of the XM 16E1, then M16A1 and later XM177E1, these weapons never failed to operate for me as an Infantryman. What I would have preferred but was not able to make happened was a M14 with chopped down barrel and that was because I never was in the rear areas where I could find a M14 and get t hat done. That said, I used what was issued and the limitations of such weaponry.

A shorter M14 in .243 Win would have been ideal but dreams of such in my mind during my time in RVN were day dreams of what might be...and M1A's later evolved this way under SAI manufacture.

All the good research done in this thread is academic, after the fact and only proves how Army R&D lost control and by the way that small arms acquisition program is still going no where...we've been promised a new battle rifle since 2008 in the Army and no cigar yet to the field. Marines gave up on Army and went in early 2008 to HK platform and have a new rifle albeit still 556 caliber.

I am not a proponent of 556 nor AR15, although piston system AR's are the obvious end state for the AR platform. 556 has limitation even with 77 gr ammo (far better than 55 gr).

Myths: 18 or 28 in a mag is about as valid as the Army put salt peter in our chow to limit sexual drives of soldiers. Fact: issue of mags is abuse and non maintenance and use of cruddy ammo. Keep ammo and mags clean and inspect for any issues, keep weapon clean and operational , then performance of mag, ammo and weapon (any weapon) will serve you well.

By the way, the other myth of that era was if you got the "black syph", there was no cure, you were put on an island off Viet Nam and that was all folks, so don't forget to take prevention seriously on R&R and always load 18 in a 20 rd mag or 28 in a 30 rd mag. Keep faith in all myths and rumors and if you don't hear one today by 0900,, take charge and issue one your self.

I found the M14 too long in jungles and M16 far more effective in jungles.

The only time I know my rounds deflected was in U Minh Forest , IV Corps, Mekong Delta where green bamboo could be 4 to 6 inches thick (diameter) and it was defeating 556 and even our M60's with 762 had a rough go shooting thru that stuff. The other guys weapons no better by the way. Casualties happened though on both sides so a fight is a fight.

I'd rather argue M1A Scout vs AK 47 and if I could turn the time machine back, I'd put my pay check on the Scout out matching the AK47. However M16 vs AK47 was a near match that , in my view, favored the AK47 for absolute trustworthiness and a better caliber for Viet Nam conditions. However the M16 with lesser caliber was adequate but not superior in all regards. As said , all flavors of M16 ever issued to me in RVN and later years always worked and never failed me but never was I ever demented to believe it was the "Best" rifle American ought to be armed with.

There were times in Afghanistan & Iraq that the distances defeated the M4 and 556 caliber and I so wanted a M14 or a M1 rifle to reach effectively at 600 meters or farther. The SAW didn't hack it at those ranges either, the PKM of the other guy was what worked !!!

One shot at SLAM Marshall limited
"survey" in Europe in WWII...No Cigar !!! . In VN War, Afghanistan nor Iraq, I never saw, heard or know about soldiers or Marines not firing their weapons. Come to think of it SLAM Marshall, you never asked USMC if Marines fired their rifles in the Pacific nor US Army in Pacific nor Italy. My experience is soldiers shoot, they have a vote and they vote in a fire fight. Oh yes they do. We fight , we are not neutered and need a safe space to hid !!

Well, besides the comments above, I don't have an opinion whatsoever to jot down.

A few things- you were in Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan and used the M14, XM16E1, M16A1, XM177E1/2 and M16A2? Impressive. Second, how did the A2 have a better barrel, ammo and sights? How does making the rifle 2 pounds heavier to almost the same weight as the M14 (one of the main reasons they dumped it) accomplish anything? The barrel was made unnecessarily front heavy for no valid reason and added a faster twist denigrating it's wounding effectiveness, for no other reason other than to stabilize 64 gr. tracer ammo. The sights were exactly the same looking thru them (other than the useless adjustable rear competition knob) and the front sight was made thinner from the A1 tapered version; no real difference there. And we went from M193 (far more devastating) to the green tip trash, which is no longer used for a reason and was shown to be a very poor performer in every theater it was used in. The A2 WAS NOT an improved rifle by any means. As far as putting 18 rds. in a 20 rd. mag, my father was in the USMC in Vietnam and that was standard practice; I don't think that was done for absolutely no reason, nor is it a myth. Never heard of an issue with M14 magazines. By your own admission, the M16 was "adequate". I don't understand the logic of replacing a proven performer with something that is merely "adequate". A whopping 5" shorter OAL is not night and day difference. The 5.56's only real effectiveness was tumbling, yawing and fragmenting; absent that, it didn't do much damage, and even that action happened some of the time, and not reliably. Bottom line, as I said in the title, none of these numbers jive that validate the M14's replacement. People believe what they want to even with stone cold evidence in front of them to the contrary to justify their agenda or emotional preferences at the given time, turning into apologists. This platform and cartridge are no different......... Don't mean you specifically, just people in general.

 

[Random Guy]

If I may quote the US Infantry Board’s report from 1962 that contributed to the M14s demise. It was stressed that, in their opinion, the M14 was ”disappointing in the automatic role, no matter how expert the rifleman.”

Since 1945 John Garand had worked on this vexing issue of excessive muzzle rise and subsequent unacceptable shot dispersion with his full auto T20 series rifles, but he never overcame the laws of physics or the suboptimal design of the grip on the standard M1/M14 stock. Excerpt for R. Blake Stephens book in the M14 (page 248):

The hope in 1960-61 was the flipper buttpad and heavy M2 bipod (seen on the canceled M15) would make the lightweight M14 controllable in full auto - at least in the prone position - but that was not the case. Army and USMC testing results were reportedly “disappointing.”

This lead to the M14E2, which was compared against the M60. Physics was on the side of the heavy M60, and note the muzzle rise and shot dispersion issues:

By 1962-63 it was clear that the M16 was simply far more controllable in full auto, and that basic requirement advantage was something the M14 could not overcome. The stock on the M14E2 was a decent effort to try and mitigate some of the erratic shot dispersion - but it came too late (circa 1964), as the M14 program had already been canceled the previous year…

If the common solider with an M14 can’t hit his target with all the muzzle rise and erratic shot dispersion in burst fire - then the ballistic advantages of the 7.62mm over the 5.56mm are sort of rendered a moot point, right? However, as a semi-auto DMR or sniper rifle? Works great(!).

Funny historical factoid:
“On July 4, 1960, when Air Force General Curtis LeMay attended a BBQ at a farm in Maryland owned by Dick Boutelle, President of Armalite Division, Fairchild Hiller Corporation, he unknowingly set in motion the steps necessary for the AR15 to become widely regarded as “America’s Rifle.”

LeMay was a seasoned veteran of World War II and still holds the distinction of being the youngest four-star general in American history, having earned the fourth star in 1951 at the age of 44. At the time of the BBQ in 1960, he was the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, making him one of the event’s most esteemed guests.

Air Force General Curtis LeMay (Courtesy USAF)

Like all good Independence Day celebrations, the BBQ attendees enjoyed some trigger time with a variety of firearms. Most notable among them was Colt Armalite AR15 Model 01, serial number 000106.

Watermelons were placed down range and General LeMay was given the opportunity to shoot this new rifle at the delicious targets out to, at least, 100 yards. After the general had destroyed the melons with ease, it was brought to his attention that there was one melon remaining.

When asked if the final target should be placed down range, LeMay declined. Instead, he offered an alternate plan: “Let’s eat the son of a bitch!”
****

So, I guess the blame for canceling the M14 program lays not just with SecDef Robert McNamara, it’s also likely in part due to General Curtis LeMay and all those helpless watermelons that he easily shot up with an early AR15 in full auto mode at a 4th of July party…. Afterwards he became a big fan and pushed hard for adoption of the M16. Random factoid.

 

[milprileb]

TXPI

First, I am not defending the AR vs M14 decision, I was in high school then so all I can comment upon is my experience with both rifles. I'd have been just fine with a M14 in .243 in Viet Nam and a shorter barrel for jungle operations. In Europe, Cold War Era the M14 hands down in 762 Nato for all missions in my view.

The A2 heavier barrel was more accurate and its rear sights far more effective in adjusting. It was plagued by the half nitwit idea of a 3 rd burst device so that was a real sore point with all who used it. The A2 butt stock stronger and more robust than the A1. The 62 gr ammo more effective shooting through things and you do shoot through things, ie penetration. It was found to be inadequate later and replaced by 77 gr ammo which is far better but here we are debating 556 ammo and I'm not defending 556 ammo, I prefer a heavier caliber for all missions of the Infantry. Is that .243, 6.8, or 6.5...I'll take any or all of them over 556.

So argue what is best but at the soldier level, we made the M16 in all forms work as best as it could be made to do , it was in my view reliable enough but lacked a sufficient caliber. We made the M16 work because we had no other choice. That doesn't mean it won't kill and do that effectively. I said but perhaps not as clear as necessary, I think the NVA had a advantage with 762x39 caliber over our 556 in the jungle.

Here's a angle if you want to chase wind mills, find out who benefitted financially over the decision to adopt the M16, the foot steps will lead from McNamara out to somewhere is my guess. Follow the money and the actors involved: there you may find the real evidence of why the M14 was pulled and the M16 replaced it.

.300 Black Out might have been a great caliber for RVN operations is my guess had it been in Eugene Stoner's mind but it seems velocity was his focus .

As to the M16A2 which you do not consider an improvement and we did at the time of issue. Just remember nothing else was on the table to replace all the worn out M16A1's on hand , add that fact along with the US Army did not test to find a better combat rifle, they just improved the status quo. Do not read that to mean approval , read that to mean anything was better than our worn out ratty M16a1's. The A2 was better but it was not great and it was not the battle rifle we needed then or now.

I don't think the Army Ordinance Corps was innovative, rather it was at best not up to the task post WWII to find a better battle rifle and likely had no funding to do so. They did manage to make the M1 better in the M14 rifle design and managed to swindle the tests of M14 vs FNFAL to win the competition. I'd have been fine with either rifle winning and own both rifles, but I prefer the M14 because of its far better accuracy and superior rear sight. Both rifles ruthlessly reliable and firing a more than effective caliber for the missions of Cold War.

I'd be remiss not to remind all the myth that floated on the M16 being self cleaning and it was not myth that many M16's got issued w/o troops trained on it and proper cleaning gear issued along with the Correct 556 ammo. Give McNamara full credit for the changing of proper propellants for obtuse rationale and it cost lives. That was a crime.