[Random Guy]

The point of all this is- For a weapon and magazine touted as lighter and can carry more ammo (the M16), it's simply not true. If one CAN carry more ammo, it didn't seem to happen, canceling out the ammo weight argument.

I don’t think the M14 vs M16 was about “numbers” per se regarding weight of rifle or weight of ammo, etc - it was about whether or not the platform meets the military’s stated requirements. Eventually it was realized the M14 as an infantry solider’s machine gun didn’t meet the requirements as well as the M16. Controllability was a key requirement/issue, and producibility /delays was also a factor, which I will explain below.

Long story short, Robert McNamara was frustrated with various M14 production delays and QA/QC problems, and presumably its lack of meeting the core requirement of an effective/ controllable select fire weapon - all of which led to the cancellation of that program in 1963 - esp given that the M16 was then seen as a suitable replacement.

Remember, the replacement for the M1 with a select fire rifle began way back in late 1944 when SA was ordered to make full-auto M1 Garand type rifles (for the anticipated invasion of mainland Japan). This journey started with John Garand developing the T20E2 by mid-1945. He tried many different and large muzzle brakes to reduce muzzle rise and erratic shot dispersion… Ten years later, a rigorous comparison between the T44 vs T48 was undertaken, which resulted in T44E4 being selected in May 1957. However, over two years later - no M14 rifles had been delivered until late 1959, when SA delivered its first batch to the military. Lots of reasons for this including labor and funding constraints, etc. Regardless, I think historically, 1960 was a fateful year.

In early testing at Ft Hood in 1960 there were some catastrophic failures of H&R M14s. I think one (or two?) soldier(s) were hurt when the M14 self-destructed. Some WRA M14s also shows some defects after Proof firing. The entire M14 production process was immediately halted for three months, and a root cause analaysis was performed, with new / more robust QA/QC processes developed for H&R and Winchester production of M14s. (TRW’s contract came later). Production resumed but some reputation damage was likely done in the process.

IIRC, it was also 1960 when Robert McNamara visited ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ at the border crossing between East and West Germany, considered to be the most dangerous potential ‘hot spot’ during the Cold War. To his dismay, the US troops there were still armed with old M1 Garands, and he was embarrassed at the pictures of our troops still armed with that WW2 era weapon. Reportedly, McNamara ordered that US troops at that critical location be armed with the new M14s. There are indeed subsequent pictures of new M14s being inspected by troops in West Germany (all rifles had slotted handguards). Again, there was likely some reputation harm/embarrassment done to the M14 program, based on what the reference books say.

By 1962 production had finally increased somewhat but still not high enough. It was also clear that the M14 was not controllable in full-auto mode, not even with the new M2 bipod and the “flipper” buttplate, and this was the core requirement of the program going back to 1945 when the US military ordered SA to build a select fire version of the M1 for the upcoming invasion of Japan. By 1963 the M14's "controllability issue" led to the development of what became the M14E2 and later M14A1 rifle, but I don’t think the US Army or it’s civilian leadership were likely happy about the “controllability” issue that was apparent in various reports. So as of 1962, a full 17 years after the end of WW2, and 5 years since the M14 had been formally adopted - the US had still not equipped the bulk of its U.S. Army and Marine Corps with a select fire infantry rifle. Recruits were still being trained on M1 Garands. This fact was frustrating DoD leadership - and even Congress had hearings on why the M14 program was plagued with production delays.

At this time the overall commander of the US Air Force had famously tested the AR15 on a poor water melon (at a picnic I recall), showing that it was in fact quite controllable in full auto mode with the small 5.56mm cartridge. The Air Force ordered these new rifles from Colt as the M16…and that started a process to completely re-evaluate the M14 program. The famous General Curtis LeMay of the Air Force really wanted the AR-15/M16, and McNamara listened and had ARPA do an analysis based on General LeMay's praise of the little black rifle. The result was the Hitch Report of 1962, which stated the M16 was superior to the M14. (I won't argue the conclusions of that report, just stating what is in the historical record).

Bottomline: The M14 contact with the private sector was supposed to replace the US’s five million M1 Garands on a ‘one-for-one’ basis, presumably by the mid-1960s. However it was clear to DoD leadership and Congress by early 1963 that this was not going to happen - due to a host of issues outlined above. Moreover, the rifle was also not controllable in full auto fire by the average 150 pound Army recruit/solider. In contrast, the lighter M16 was controllable in full auto, and was also seen as a more “modern” or “space age” firearm. It was favorably compared to the Russian AK-47 (which was also controllable in full auto). The aluminum and plastic M16 was also easier to mass produce relative to the traditional “wood and steel” M14 (and complex manufacturing and heat treatment processes). Lastly, the 1962 Hitch report suggested the M16 was a better platform, and that was basically it for the M14.

So Robert McNamara decided to “cut his losses” and canceled the M14 program in 1963, with TRW delivering the last batch of 200 rifles to the US military in 1964. Only 1.3 million of the planned 5 million rifles were made. The M16 became the main focus and it was quickly procured and issued given the war in Vietnam. However, all that haste during the war resulted in some weapon and ammo issues in the field that tarnished its early reputation, so changes were made to address those issues. The rest is history, as they say.

 

[Random Guy]

It doesn’t really matter because all engagements going back to World War I that have been documented are under 300 yards, with the exception of maybe the mountains of Afghanistan.

Actually, it was the mountains of Afghanistan and the open expanses of Iraq that generated a U.S. Army report (correction thesis) in 2009 that noted the following about engagement distances:
-M4 Carbine with M855 has an effective range of 300 meters.
-Our enemies understood that range limitation.
-Our enemies therefore would shoot at us with weapons that have ranges that exceed 300 meters, often using Russian light machine guns (7.62x54r) at a distance of half a kilometer away or more.
-This situation required more firepower than an M4 w/ M855. The US Army needed each deployed Squad with a SDM rifle with a 600 meter effective range. The Army report was called “Taking back the Half Kilometer” or something along those lines.

Outcome? The quick program at Rock Island Arsenal to make 6200 M14 based EBR-RI rifles circa 2009-2012. Then qualified soliders were trained as Squad Designated Marksmen, and how to use the EBRs effectively out to 600 meters. Sometimes this training also included an evening on the range where night vison scopes were used. These EBR-RIs were then sent to Afghanistan as our stop-gap 7.62x51mm SDM rifle.

This was always a stop-gap program to meet urgent mission requirements, as M14s have not been produced since 1964, and thus were in a “non-procurable” status. The Army was also very dissatisfied with the M249 squad machine gun and it’s poor performance w/ M855 ammo. Something with longer range, more accuracy, and energy was desperately needed.

So an upgrade was needed on both platforms based on the hard lessons learned in Afghanistan and to some extent Iraq. So a new RFP was developed after the conflict wound down. (Pasting below what I wrote 6 months ago re this topic).

So, the genesis of the Next Generation SQUAD Weapon (NGSW) contract/program was built around a new light machine gun that could defeat modern body armor. There was dissatisfaction with the M249 as a Squad Automatic weapon in Afghanistan and Iraq. That light machine gun in 5.56 had poor range, poor accuracy, and poor penetration capabilities. So a new cartridge was designed to to provide the infantry squad's machine gunner with a 1200 meter capability for aimed fire, and also able to penetrate modern body armor of "peer or near peer" adversaries (ie, Russia and China).

So here was the 3 or 4 key requirements for industry:
-Light machine gun with 1200 meter effective range.
-Infantry rifle with 600 meter effective range
-6.8mm cartridge that defeats “peer and near peer” body armor at extended ranges - but no longer than a 308W cartridge (ie, 2.800” length).
-Sound suppression capability.
(Note: A separate RFP and contract awarded for the unique optic systems for both platforms)

The biggest challenge for the industry was the first requirement re 1200 meter effective range - with a 6.8mm cartridge no longer or heavier than 7.62x51mm NATO. This effective range required a 3k velocity out of a short barrel - and thus extreme pressure levels that a traditional brass case can not handle - so industry developed innovative case designs.

People seem to think the program was only about a new infantry rifle, but that was seemingly secondary - what is primary was giving the machine gunner something more lethal than the M249, but not as heavy as the 27-pound M240 (aka "The Pig" as it is referred to in the military).

The XM250 (now M250) on top is what the US Army wanted as the main course, and the little XM5 (now M7) as the appetizer - a better platform than the M4 Carbine that can use the same 6.8x51mm ammo - both the standard pressure and high-pressure ammo will work with each system. But most training on the M7 will be the standard pressure ammo. Not sure about the M250, but I'd guess the full pressure ammo would be used for qualification given the range requirements. The innovative optic systems are shown below:

Most of the Army will still be using the M4A1, M249, and M240B (in 7.62X51mm NATO) for the foreseeable future. The XM5/XM7 in 6.8X51mm is (at least initially) only going to be issued to the cool guys. If you read the article cited, the initial contract only allows for 250K rifles, max - with the provision that some of those could go to the USMC if they're interested. Eventually, they may issue an M7 to everyone in the Army, but not initially.

A decision by June 30th, 2023 will reportedly determine if the rifle will go into mass production. The only thing that could change that is if US Army finds fundamental flaw(s) with the either the M7, M250, 6.5x51mm ammo, or the two optic systems. So June 30th is the last "go" versus "no-go" decision point. It's not a Special Forces rifle - it's the formal replacement for the M4 Carbine for anyone who might be in a 'trigger puller' MOS.

The main logistical thing that will delay the roll-out to ALL US Army infantry troops is the requirement for enough ammunition supply needed for training and deployment purposes, and that is why Lake City is building an entirely new building to exclusively produce the 6.8x51mm ammo - capable of making millions of rounds per year by the year 2026. Appears to be a done deal at this point - unless some fatal flaw was discovered this summer, at the end of the IOT&E period – Initial Operational Test and Evaluation period.

Folks should really watch the last 7 minutes of this video (starting at minute 28:00 if you don't have time for the full video) - it will quickly dispel with a lot of the misinformation out there:

The fundamental shift in US military thinking is that we are choosing to use a machine gun cartridge for the basic infantry rifle. 55 years ago we made the decision to go with the small caliber (5.56mm) infantry rifle and go away from the full-power machine gun round of the M14. Again, the high pressure 6.8x51mm cartridge was designed first and foremost as a 1200 meter capable light machine gun round, and it will render both the M249 and M240 obsolete. (Although the Army has released a contract for vendors to convert the legacy M240s to the new 6.8x51mm round).

The military decided that the standard pressure 6.8x51mm round will be the new infantry standard, and in combat the high-pressure round will be issued that will easily defeat modern body armor of "peer or near peer" military forces (ie, Russia and China). That round will double the effective range of the standard infantry rifle. Note: the M4 Carbine w/ M855 ammo has a 300 meter effective range, but the new M7 (formerly M5) has a 600 meter effective range, and given its an effectively sound suppressed rifle, marksmanship scores will likely go up considerably.

Contract info:
120,000 – Soldiers in the Army’s active (COMPO 1) and reserve (COMPO 2) close combat force– identified as infantrymen, cavalry scouts, combat engineers, medics, special operations, and forward observers– who will use the NGSW platforms. Army spokesmen this week said other units and specialties will continue to use legacy small arms. “For example, the company supply sergeant will continue to carry M-4 or another weapon, not the Next-Gen Weapon.”

250,000 – Current ceiling of NGSWs in the contract. With that being said, the Army stated this week the current thinking is to field 107,000 M5 rifles and 13,000 M250 machine guns initially, roughly an 8:1 ratio.

....so basically everyone who is a potential 'trigger puller' will have one of the M7s in the years a head, but not the supply clerks or admin staff who will presumably never be a trigger-puller in combat.

Bottom-line: The high-pressure 6.8x51mm was - and is - designed as a machine gun cartridge that out performs the 7.62 NATO, and the standard pressure 6.8x51mm will work well in the M7 infantry rifle out to 600 meters as required. In the case of war, both systems can use the high-pressure ammo - and its a good thing both rifles have effective suppressors, as 80k PSI cartridge would produce A LOT of muzzle blast without a suppressor.

As noted by Ian McCollum in that video, he thinks US Army machine gunners are going to love the new M250, and I suspect he is right about that... As for the legacy "Pigs" (aka M240), the Army wants a vendor to re-engineer and offer a conversion kit for the 6.8x51mm. The biggest issue I see with the new cartridge is the lack of NATO adoption.

 

[Random Guy]

You cannot compare M14 production to anything as it was budget constrained to 3,000 rifles per month, per contractor.

I’ve not read that. Maybe that applies to only the first year contract from FY1959? (Exactly 35,003 were ordered for H&R and WRA). Clearly by FY1960 the military was ordering more the 36k rifles per contractor, and from 1961-63 they were making well in excess of 3k per month. Here’s the order vs production data:

 

[Random Guy]

Here’s the Abstract to the 2009 Army report (correction: thesis) for anyone interested. 300 meters is generally consider by the US Army as the accepted effective range of the M4 Carbine. The SDM role at the Squad levand SDMR rifle were the apparent outcome:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA512331.pdf

“Not procurable” M14 based SDM circa 2009 to about 2016/17 (6200 were made)

Newly procurable G28-based US Army SDMR circa 2019/2020 to present day (I’ve read that 6k were ordered, as a one-for-one replacement of the old EBR-RI).

 

[Random Guy]

If I may quote the US Infantry Board’s report from 1962 that contributed to the M14s demise. It was stressed that, in their opinion, the M14 was ”disappointing in the automatic role, no matter how expert the rifleman.”

Since 1945 John Garand had worked on this vexing issue of excessive muzzle rise and subsequent unacceptable shot dispersion with his full auto T20 series rifles, but he never overcame the laws of physics or the suboptimal design of the grip on the standard M1/M14 stock. Excerpt for R. Blake Stephens book in the M14 (page 248):

The hope in 1960-61 was the flipper buttpad and heavy M2 bipod (seen on the canceled M15) would make the lightweight M14 controllable in full auto - at least in the prone position - but that was not the case. Army and USMC testing results were reportedly “disappointing.”

This lead to the M14E2, which was compared against the M60. Physics was on the side of the heavy M60, and note the muzzle rise and shot dispersion issues:

By 1962-63 it was clear that the M16 was simply far more controllable in full auto, and that basic requirement advantage was something the M14 could not overcome. The stock on the M14E2 was a decent effort to try and mitigate some of the erratic shot dispersion - but it came too late (circa 1964), as the M14 program had already been canceled the previous year…

If the common solider with an M14 can’t hit his target with all the muzzle rise and erratic shot dispersion in burst fire - then the ballistic advantages of the 7.62mm over the 5.56mm are sort of rendered a moot point, right? However, as a semi-auto DMR or sniper rifle? Works great(!).

Funny historical factoid:
“On July 4, 1960, when Air Force General Curtis LeMay attended a BBQ at a farm in Maryland owned by Dick Boutelle, President of Armalite Division, Fairchild Hiller Corporation, he unknowingly set in motion the steps necessary for the AR15 to become widely regarded as “America’s Rifle.”

LeMay was a seasoned veteran of World War II and still holds the distinction of being the youngest four-star general in American history, having earned the fourth star in 1951 at the age of 44. At the time of the BBQ in 1960, he was the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, making him one of the event’s most esteemed guests.

Air Force General Curtis LeMay (Courtesy USAF)

Like all good Independence Day celebrations, the BBQ attendees enjoyed some trigger time with a variety of firearms. Most notable among them was Colt Armalite AR15 Model 01, serial number 000106.

Watermelons were placed down range and General LeMay was given the opportunity to shoot this new rifle at the delicious targets out to, at least, 100 yards. After the general had destroyed the melons with ease, it was brought to his attention that there was one melon remaining.

When asked if the final target should be placed down range, LeMay declined. Instead, he offered an alternate plan: “Let’s eat the son of a bitch!”
****

So, I guess the blame for canceling the M14 program lays not just with SecDef Robert McNamara, it’s also likely in part due to General Curtis LeMay and all those helpless watermelons that he easily shot up with an early AR15 in full auto mode at a 4th of July party…. Afterwards he became a big fan and pushed hard for adoption of the M16. Random factoid.

 

[Random Guy]

My one and only black rifle project is this variant, a Mk 12 Mod 0, but it lacks the correct scope as seen here. This SOCOM specific weapon was of course a massive improvement over the regular old rack grade M16A2/A4, assuming proper match ammo is used...

I think its fair to say that not all M16s are created equal, and that also applies to 5.56mm ammo...

From what I have read, the biggest break-though with the M16 was the high BC 77 grain bullets that Sierra developed in the mid to late 1990s. It turned the M16 rifle into a 600 yard competitive NM rifle, and a decent DMR rifle with something like a Mk 12 Mod 0/1. It also ended the M14's reign at the National Matches. The results of US Army AMU testing are not debatable....

And the 600 yard results are most impressive as well. Before those high BC bullets, shooting the M16 at 600 yards was a waste of time and effort...but that all changed with the 77 gr SMK and the development of the Mk 262 ammo.

 

[Random Guy]

Actually, that is a thesis for a Masters Degree, not an official report. It carries no official weight.

Yes, but the conclusions were quite obvious to the US Army when that thesis was published. The point I was trying to make about that 2009 thesis is that during the the mid to late 200Xs, Operational Needs Statements (ONS) had been submitted by U.S. Army combat commanders that comport with precisely what is in that thesis/report - the effective range of the 5.56mm M4 was insufficient for combat in Afghanistan. The consensus was something with longer range was needed. That is why thousands of M14s in 7.62 NATO were being pulled out of storage beginning with the war in Afghanistan and then Iraq as well. As Doug Carlstrom stated here:

How the U.S. Army Builds the M14 EBR-RI - Guns and Ammo

The M14 EBR-RI has become a legend in the military community, and this was the only time a writer was allowed inside TACOM to document the building of these chassis-based M14s.

www.gunsandammo.com

"I was deployed to Iraq in 2004 and to Afghanistan in 2006 to open a small arms support center," Carlstrom says. "I opened Camp Anaconda in Balad, Iraq, and started learning how soldiers were using their rifles. At that time, units were pulling M14s out of storage and issuing them to marksmen within a squad for more accuracy, range and effectiveness."

The first M14 rifles were fielded to units as they came out of Anniston Army Depot. Those M14s were still wearing wooden or nylon stocks and a brown nylon handguard. They were equipped with only one magazine and had no provisions for optics. Carlstrom observed soldiers trying to attach commercial mounts, rings and optics to these M14s with little consistency or repeatable accuracy. After seeing soldiers trying to adapt the M14 to a modern battlefield, Carlstrom concluded that this situation was unacceptable. When he returned to CONUS, he set out to resolve this problem.

All of the joint services were using some configuration of the M14 EBR (my note: Navy/SOCOM Mk 14 Mod 0/1, USMC M39, Air Force Mk 14 Mods). The (US Army) M14 EBR-RI was built and tested at Rock Island Arsenal by the team that developed it. It was a response to the large number of Operational Need Statements (ONS) submitted for M14 rifles to support the role of a Squad Designated Marksman (SDM). The M14 EBR-RI was designed to standardize the optic among soldiers, offers sustainability in the field and featured a chassis constructed from lightweight aircraft aluminum capable of supporting the use of a night vision device in front of the day optic.
***

Between 2009 and 2012 Doug Carlstrom and Mike Petersen (who is an occasionally forum member here) built 6200 M14 EBR-RI in support of those Operational Needs Statements submitted by U. S. Army combat unit commanders overseas. The training program with the EBR-RI consisted of training the soldiers to shoot with precision out to 600 meters with the 7.62mm NATO EBR-RIs. Thus, the US Army soldier's 2009 Master’s thesis comports precisely with what all those circa 200X Operational Needs Statement were about, and the EBR-RI was subsequently issued beginning in 2009 to US Army Squads deployed in Afghanistan - all in a focused effort to "take back the half kilometer" from our enemy. Numerous ONS or that thesis from 2009 - they were all saying the same thing about the need for something more effective than an M4 - which is the point I was trying to make about evolving policy. (Resulting a few years later in an RFP and the M110A1 SDMR program)

(Fwiw, I also know of at least one case where a PhD thesis from a civilian engineer working at the DoE was peer reviewed by academics including some military personnel - and subsequently the thesis was redacted with entire sections deemed classified by the NSA - as it subsequently impacted DoD policy in the technical area evaluated by that thesis... So, even a PhD thesis (aka "unofficial report") on a relevant area - can sometimes carry official weight - esp if it touches on, or illuminates, a relevant topic to the gov't that impacts the decision(s) of policy makers. For the record, it was not my thesis, but that of a very smart guy that I have met).

 

[Random Guy]

Fwiw, I’ve known Milprileb for several years. He’s a Range Officer at Quantico Shooting Club. He’s retired Army/1st SFG and only shoots his rifles at 1000 yards, as anything less is apparently not challenging enough. No joke. This includes his M1A in an E2 stock. To really challenge himself he shoots his M1903A4 at 1000 yards with an old Lyman 2.5x scope. He does very well at the 1000 yard line. I took this pic of him several years ago w/ that set-up. Like many old timers, he has (perhaps strong) opinions based on his lifetime experiences, including missions in exotic locations... He always gives me grief as I can only sneak down to the QSC vintage matches twice per year. I don’t question his wisdom or opinions, as I was never a career Army veteran or a member of the 1st Special Forces Group. Just an fyi…

 

[Random Guy]

I’m not going to wade further into this theead, but I will simply note that milprileb is a long-time Range Safety Officer at the Quantico Marine Corp base. He was a member of the U.S. Army’s 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) back the day. I recall the year he told me that he retired from active duty after a full career in 1st SFG:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Special_Forces_Group_(United_States)

What he did for a living in the early to mid-200Xs I don’t know, maybe he was a US military contractor/ advisor or maybe a NG/reservist, I have never asked him. I do know that even into his mid-70s, he enjoys shooting retro sniper rifles at 1000 yards, seen here with his 1903A4 w/ a Lyman 2.5x scope (circa 2017 at Quantico Range 4). I was impressed, hence this pic:

He sometimes runs the so-called “milk jug contest” (5 shots at a 1000 yards, with NO sighters. Better know your dope, and how to make wind calls). Hit the jug within 5 shots, and you get the sticker. Otherwise you go home until the following contest. I still need to try and earn this coveted bumper sticker…

Does he have strong opinions? Yes.
Is he a keyboard warrior? No. He served a long time.

FWIW, despite his age and his glasses, he’s still a good shooter. He spends a lot of time at the 1000 yard berm at Quantico Range 4, and once told me that he only shoots at 1000 yards in his retirement, as “anything less isn’t challenging at this point.” Just say’n….