[lysander]

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO COMMENCE AT APPROXIMATELY 1300Z ON 18 DEC 1972 A THREE DAY MAXIMUM EFFORT // REPEAT MAXIMUM EFFORT // OF B-52 // TACAIR STRIKES IN THE HANOI // HAIPHONG AREAS AGAINST TARGET CONTAINED IN THE AUTHORIZED TARGET LIST . . . BE PREPARED TO EXTEND OPERATIONS PAST THREE DAYS IF DIRECTED. THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS APPLY:
A. UTILIZE VISUAL AS WELL AS ALL WEATHER CAPABILITIES.
B. UTILIZE ALL RESOURCES WHICH CAN BE SPARED WITHOUT CRITICAL DETRIMENT TO OPERATIONS IN RUN AND SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN CAMBODIA.
C. UTILIZE RESTRIKES ON AUTHORIZED TARGETS, AS NECESSARY. NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR ORDER OF BATTLE, AIRFIELDS, AND ACTIVE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES MAY BE STRUCK AS TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF ATTACK FORCES AND MINIMIZE LOSSES.
D. EXERCISE PRECAUTION TO MINIMIZE RISK TO CIVILIAN CAUSALITIES UTILIZING LGB [LASER GUIDED BOMBS] WEAPONS AGAINST DESIGNATED TARGETS. AVOID DAMAGE TO THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING.

The largest B-52 air strike in history was launched.

At 2:51 PM (local) the first of 87 B-52s lifted off the runway at Andersen AFB, Guam, to be joined by another 42 out of U-Tapao RTNAB, Thailand. All total, 129 B-52s from three Strategic Air Wings (43rd Bombardment Wing (BW), 307th Strategic Wing (SW) and 72nd Strategic Wing [Provisional]) were launched for strikes against Hoa Lac, Kep, Phuc Yen, Kinh No, Yen Vien, Gia Lam, Hanoi.

Four B-52s had to return to base after take-off, due to mechanical issues, three B-52s had issues that prevented bomb release over their targets, and one was hit by a SAM moments before bomb release, 121 B-52s dropped over 4 million pounds of bombs that night.

As Brown cell turned away from Hoa Lac airfield after bomb release, a MiG warning was sent out that one was attempting to intercept the bomber stream. In Brown 03 (B-52D 55-0676 out of U-Tapao), the trail bomber of the trail cell, SSgt Samuel O. Turner picked up the rapidly closing MiG and engaged it with his radar directed quad-fifties. After about three bursts the MiG disappeared from his screen. Another tail gunner observed the engagement and confirmed the kill. This was the first kill by a B-52 tail gunner.

In addition to the B-52s, there were fifteen F-111A bombing sorties, thirteen F-105G and four F-4C sorties for SAM suppression, sixty-three escort/CAP fighter sorties and twenty-two chaff bomber sorties, nine Navy A-7 SAM suppression sorties, thirty-four Navy and Marine A-6 Intruder bombing sorties, and 240 additional tanker, command and control, radar, and electronic warfare sorties in support of the night's mission.

One F-111A, one Navy A-7C, one B-52D and two B-52Gs (one was the Deputy Airborne Commander's aircraft) were lost, with another three B-52s damaged.

Seven crewmen were killed (two, the F-111 crew, are still listed as missing).

Lt Col Donald L. Rissi
Lt Col Ronald J Ward (MIA)
Maj James R. McElvan (MIA)
Capt Richard W. Cooper
1st Lt Robert J. Thomas
TSgt Walter L. Ferguson
TSgt Charlie S. Poole

 

[Fishjager]

Sad for the families of those lost! Sad for the POW's who suffered because of it. Sorry for those who never came home. Touching story.

 

[HappyTrails]

It is stunning and impressive what we can do. And I am glad we can.
But there's that "hearts and minds" thing that we seem to seldom get right. Sadly.

 

[lysander]

Sad for the families of those lost! Sad for the POW's who suffered because of it. Sorry for those who never came home. Touching story.

Incidentally, it was the the plight of the PoWs that initiated Operation Linebacker II.

The North Vietnamese government was unwilling to include repatriation of PoWs in the peace talks, eventually walking out on the negotiations because of it. The VN walk-out was extremely poorly timed, the elections were over (Nixon carried 49 States) and Congress was on Christmas recess. So, these factors gave Nixon the prime opportunity to get them back to the table, one way or another.

It was one of the better run air operations of the war, first, it had specific goals (get the NV back to the negotiating table, and open discussions concerning PoWs), two, the military planners had a much freer hand in choosing targets (unlike Operation Rolling Thunder, where the White House picked the targets), what type of aircraft could be utilized (prior to Linebacker II, the use of B-52s had been restricted to below the 17th parallel), and three what tactics were to be utilized.

General Vogt (CG, 7th Air Force) stated once the only thing he felt was poorly executed was, due to the compressed time-frame the operation had to be completed in (it had to be completed before the end of the Congressional Christmas recess), he couldn't completely neutralize the NV air defenses prior to sending in the heavy bombers. (A mistake, I am glad to say, we have never repeated.)

 

[GardenValley]

It is stunning and impressive what we can do. And I am glad we can.
But there's that "hearts and minds" thing that we seem to seldom get right. Sadly.

I don't believe the "hearts and minds" thing ever really works. There was a saying back then that "When you have 'em by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow." There is more truth in that than all the effort that could be put into other attempts to win "hearts and minds." John Kennedy once said that, "Diplomacy is often conducted at the point of a bayonet" and he was right.

Back to the point of this post ...., kudos to the B-52 crewmen. They many times flew in support of us at Khe Sanh and I can't say enough good things about what they did for us.

 

[dwight55]

Being in the Navy, . . . never had a lot of day to day with the USAF, . . . but I will give a hearty "thank you" to the one stripe airman at Can Tho, . . . he was running what ever you call it in a quonset hut, . . . guys brought him worn out stuff, . . . he exchanged them for new.

Just for kicks and giggles, . . . I asked him (my U.S.Navy was plainly visible over my front pocket) if I could trade my worn out jungle boots for a new pair. He just looked at me and said "Not while they are on your feet."

I still think he was one great guy, . . .

But speaking of air cover, . . . our thoughts where we were, . . . was if there was a visible F4 Phantom in the air above us, . . . we wuz safe. Still love that bird.

As for the OP, . . . thanks for the post, . . . guess I never knew we lost that many. AND, . . . I never knew about the rear gunner thing. I would absolutely love to shake his hand.

Thanks again for the info post lysander.

May God bless,
Dwight

 

[lysander]

Being in the Navy, . . . never had a lot of day to day with the USAF, . . . but I will give a hearty "thank you" to the one stripe airman at Can Tho, . . . he was running what ever you call it in a quonset hut, . . . guys brought him worn out stuff, . . . he exchanged them for new.

Just for kicks and giggles, . . . I asked him (my U.S.Navy was plainly visible over my front pocket) if I could trade my worn out jungle boots for a new pair. He just looked at me and said "Not while they are on your feet."

I still think he was one great guy, . . .

But speaking of air cover, . . . our thoughts where we were, . . . was if there was a visible F4 Phantom in the air above us, . . . we wuz safe. Still love that bird.

As for the OP, . . . thanks for the post, . . . guess I never knew we lost that many. AND, . . . I never knew about the rear gunner thing. I would absolutely love to shake his hand.

Thanks again for the info post lysander.

May God bless,
Dwight

Lesser known to the night raids by the B-52s and friends, were the day raids performed by Tactical Air Command and the US Navy. Route Package 6, the Hanoi/Haiphong corridor, was divided into two parts, The western part, RP 6A, handled by the USAF, the eastern part, RP 6B, the Navy. During the daylight hours, targets in these two areas were bombed by tactical aircraft. These day time attacks are not as extensively documented.

There were six carrier groups assigned to Task Force 77 in the Tonkin Gulf in support of Linebacker II.

Also, one Cruiser or Destroyer Leader (aka Frigate) was stationed off the coast (Code named Red Crown) providing valuable information, such as MiG and SAM activity. During December, it was the USS Long Beach or the USS Belkamp.

 

[Rich D]

I never got to see the big boys work. Had a very close encounter with 2 supersonic F4's at treetop along Eagle Beach, east of Hue City. That defined loud.

 

[lysander]

19 December 1972, Day Two:

As the last of the Day One (18 December) B-52s recovered at Andersen AFB, Guam, on the 19th of December, the pilots and crews for Day Two were finishing up crew briefings and heading out to their aircraft.

93 B-52s, 28 F-111As, 28 F-4s, and 20 A-7Ds were tasked with bombing missions for this night, along with 109 combat support sorties.

Wave 1 consisted of 12 B-52Ds and 9 B-52Gs from Andersen, and were to hit Kinh No at 8:10 pm, Wave 2, 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao and 21 B-52Gs from Andersen were to hit the Bac Giang trans-shipment complex (21 aircraft) and the Hanoi radio (15 aircraft), Wave 3, 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao, 15 B-52Ds and 6 B-52Gs from Andersen were assigned to bomb Yen Vien (9 aircraft) and Thai Nguyen Electrical power Generation Plant (27 aircraft). The B-52s would used the similar ingress and egress routes as the night before, approaching from the southwest from Thailand, flying well north of the target, turning south for the target run and exiting on a parallel track to the ingress route but further south. This was the same flight path used by F-105s attacking Hanoi during the Rolling Thunder campaign, and required a rather sharp post target turn (PTT), generally the PTT was 200 to 270 degrees, which some though might degrade ECM effectiveness by placing the antenna in non-optimal attitude with respect to the enemy radar.

The F-111As were assigned to strike Yen Bai, Hoa Lac, Phuc Yen, Kep and Bac Giang, with the bombing commencing at approximately 8:00 pm local (1300Z). The F-111s flew independently of one another using their high sophisticated terrain following radar (TFR) to maintain a 200 to 1000 foot altitude above the terrain, and since they flew completely blacked-out, it was much safer to keep well apart from one another.

(The B-52s flew with the upper navigational lights on, these, and the faint glow from the engine exhaust allowed the B-52s in each cells to maintain a mere one mile separation, and approximately 5 miles separation between cells.)

In support, there would be 15 F-105G and 4 F-4C SAM suppression flights, 61 escort/CAP flights and 24 chaff flights. The Navy/USMC would provide 41 A-6 sorties, 26 A-7 sorties and 10 F-4 sorties.

The afternoon of the 19th, while the Day One B-52s were recovering and the Day Two sorties were being prepared, USAF F-4s and A-7s bombed the Hanoi radio complex and Yen Bai using LORAN directed bomb release, necessitated by poor visibility over the targets. The accuracy of LORAN directed bomb drops was dismal, especially when compared to the almost pinpoint accuracy of the radar directed bombing of the B-52s at night.

SAM launches were fewer than the night before and the accuracy of the AAA was worse. No aircraft were downed by hostile fire, and only two received damage.

Things were looking good . . .

(One B-52, Hazel 3, B-52G-115-BW, 58-0254, had a near miss with a SAM causing the upper fuselage to be perforated with 30 to 50 shrapnel holes, but still managed to recover back at Guam, It is significant because it was the only B-52G, to receive SAM damage and not be lost. Other interesting things about the B-52G, none of the G models were fitted with external wing pylons nor did they have the "Big Belly" bomb bay modification, this limited them to only 27 bombs, all carried internally. In comparison, all the B-52D were Big Belly, allowing for internal carriage of 84 Mk82s and another 24 Mk 82s, or the 750 pound M117s, on two external pylons, giving a total load of 108 bombs. Also, the tail gunner had been moved out of his glass bubble in the tail and now sat next to the EWO, this deprived the crew of a valuable set of eyes in the rear quadrant. In many ways, the newer G was less suited to the task at hand than the older D models.)

 

[lysander]

. . . the USS Belkamp.

USS Belknap.

 

[greenradiodude]

lystander:
Thanks for posting this. I spent 7 years working on that quad .50 gunnery system, much of it at Anderson and U-Tapao.

Sad thing (to me) is, we had that capability for some time and the politicians wouldn't let us use it......

Best,
Brian

 

[lysander]

lystander:
Thanks for posting this. I spent 7 years working on that quad .50 gunnery system, much of it at Anderson and U-Tapao.

Sad thing (to me) is, we had that capability for some time and the politicians wouldn't let us use it......

Best,
Brian

Hell, if Rolling Thunder had been given the (relative) hands-off control Linebacker I (May 1972) had had, things could have been different . . .

 

[lysander]

Day Three was to be, basically, a repeat of the previous two days, 99 B-52s in three waves, Wave I was directed to bomb Gia Lam with 6 aircraft, while the remaining 27 aircraft bombed the Yen Vien rail yard for the third night in a row. Wave II was slated to attack Gia Lam with two cells of B-52Gs (6 aircraft), and Bac Giang with another 6 aircraft, 15 more aircraft were to bomb the Thai Nguyen electrical plant. Wave III sent 9 addition bombers to Gia Lam again, 12 to Kinh No, 12 to the Hanoi Rail Yards, and 6 to hit Bac Giang a second time that night. 12 individual F-111A strikes were interspersed between the B-52 strikes throughout the night. Afternoon LORAN bombing from 52 F-4s and 20 A-7 were also called for.

Support for Day Three was 14 F-105G and 4 F-4C SAM suppression flights, 55 escort/CAP flights and 24 chaff flights. Navy/USMC support would be in the form of 21 A-6s and 19 A-7s.

At 8:00 pm local (1300Z) the first cells of Wave I struck Gia Lam without incident and it looked like it was going to be another good night. Then things went pear shaped. B-52Gs Quilt 01 and Quilt 02 had ECM failures on the target run-in, just after bomb release and while in their PTT, Quilt 03, an unmodified aircraft*, was struck by a SAM and went down.
_______________________________________________________

*Of the 99 B-52G assigned to the 72nd BW, only about half had been upgraded with the “Rivet Rambler” ECM package. The lack of "Rivet Rambler" severely limited the effectiveness of the electronic countermeasure suite. After action debriefs had also noted that if a cell had one aircraft fall out and return to base for mechanical issues, the effectiveness of the cell’s ECM was severely diminished.
______________________________________________________

The next two cells, Gold and Wine, made it without trouble; however, the unmodified B-52G, Brass 02, was also having trouble with their ECM gear and was also struck by a SAM while in the PTT. Brass 02 managed to limp over the Thai border before the crew had to abandon the crippled aircraft. The next cells were B-52D aircraft. Snow and Grape cells bombed the target successfully. In the next cell, Orange 03, another unmodified G model, was slammed by two SAMs just prior to bomb release.

An A-6A (Milestone 511) was hit by a SAM and when down over Cat Bi.

The near real-time information feeds of the night’s progress was being forwarded to General John C. Meyer Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, in Omaha, and one thing was becoming very obvious, unmodified G models and aircraft with ECM degrades were vulnerable to SAMs, and worse, they reduced the ECM protection of the entire cell. So far, all B-52s downed by SAMs had ECM degrades, were unmodified Gs, or were part of a reduced ship cell.

After weighing the risks, especially to the unmodified B-52Gs, and the tactical requirements for the night’s mission, the command was given to “Press-on.”**

_______________________________________________________

** "Press-On" rules were a set of instructions listing what system degrades, weather conditions, crew conditions, etc, that justified the abortion of a mission by the aircraft. Just to note the nature of the rules, under "press-on" rules, the loss of a single engine on a B-52 did not constitute grounds for mission abort.
_______________________________________________________

But, The decision to press-on was not made without serious adjustments to minimize further losses, two cells of B-52G in Wave II were recalled just prior to crossing the 17th parallel (the last recall point), these were to have been sent “downtown” into the heavy SAM concentration around Hanoi to hit Gia Lam, which was hit already that night an due for more in Wave III, the lighter bomb load of the G’s meant that their absence would make little difference to the tonnage dropped on Gia Lam that night. The remainder of Wave II was directed to targets to the northeast of Hanoi where the SAM coverage was weaker, so they proceeded as planned. Wave 2 bombed their targets with no losses.

Unfortunately, for the G models in Wave III, recall was not an option, even though the targets were in the Hanoi SAM coverage area. An entire bomber stream (12 aircraft) directed at the lucrative Kinh No complex were G models. Worse the G’s committed to Wave III were a mix of modified and unmodified aircraft.

At 5:05 am (2205Z), B-52D Straw 02, the second aircraft of the second cell in Wave III was hit by a SAM in its PTT, the aircraft attempted to recover to a friendly base in Thailand, but had to be abandoned over Laos. The 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron successfully picked up all but the Radar Navigator, Maj Frank Gould.

The B-52G’s sent to bomb Kinh No ran into the expected trouble. The lead bomber, Olive 01, took one SAM after weapons release, two cells back, Tan 03, was not having a good night either, the bombing and navigational radar failed and while trying to calculate an accurate release point from information relayed from the Tan 02, Tan 03 drifted out of formation, and possibly out of the chaff corridor. A SAM detonated underneath the bomber and it went in to a dive, as the pilots tried to regain altitude and get back on the bomb run, a second SAM detonated next to the aircraft. Both Olive 01 and Tan 03 were unmodified G models.

The remaining targets that night were bombed without loss.

The price for the night’s work had been high, the 307th SW and the 43rd BW had each lost a B-52D and the 72nd SW(P) had lost 4 B-52Gs, and the Navy had lost an A-6A, in addition, a B-52D had been damaged. The facts were clear, all the G lost to date were unmodified G models, and most of the D models lost had had ECM degrades. Unmodified and degraded ECM aircraft were a serious liability not only to themselves but to the entire cell. Commanders at SAC HQ, 8th AF HQ, U-Tapao and Andersen had some serious thinking to do, and they had to do it before the next day, orders from the Joint Chief had just come down: the three day maximum effort had just become a sustained maximum effort . . .

Of the crews of the seven aircraft lost this night, fifteen men were killed and another died of his wounds in captivity, eleven were captured and eventually were repatriated, and eleven were recovered by the 40th ARRS.

Lt Col Keith Heggen (died of wound while PoW)
Maj Frank Gould (MIA)
Maj Edward Johnson
Maj Bobby Kirby
Maj Randolph A. Perry
Maj John F. Stewart
Capt Randall Craddock
Capt. Irwin S. Lerner
Capt George Lockhart
Capt Craig A. Paul
Capt Ronald Perry
Capt Warren R. Spencer
Capt Donovan Walters
1st LT Charles Darr
CMSgt Arthur V. McLaughlin (MIA)
A1C Charles Bebus

 

[tomdokulil]

Incidentally, it was the the plight of the PoWs that initiated Operation Linebacker II.

The North Vietnamese government was unwilling to include repatriation of PoWs in the peace talks, eventually walking out on the negotiations because of it. The VN walk-out was extremely poorly timed, the elections were over (Nixon carried 49 States) and Congress was on Christmas recess. So, these factors gave Nixon the prime opportunity to get them back to the table, one way or another.

It was one of the better run air operations of the war, first, it had specific goals (get the NV back to the negotiating table, and open discussions concerning PoWs), two, the military planners had a much freer hand in choosing targets (unlike Operation Rolling Thunder, where the White House picked the targets), what type of aircraft could be utilized (prior to Linebacker II, the use of B-52s had been restricted to below the 17th parallel), and three what tactics were to be utilized.

General Vogt (CG, 7th Air Force) stated once the only thing he felt was poorly executed was, due to the compressed time-frame the operation had to be completed in (it had to be completed before the end of the Congressional Christmas recess), he couldn't completely neutralize the NV air defenses prior to sending in the heavy bombers. (A mistake, I am glad to say, we have never repeated.)

I've always said that the truth about how the Vietnam War was fought would eventually come out. Now thanks to you and people like you, it has. Thanks again! Tom from MN U.S. Navy 1967 - 1971

 

[ACampCmdrLegacy]

Thanks to those men.

A few won't ever forget their service.............


ed.: learn new stuff every day - thought Ravens had replaced EB-66 by then; not so...

 

[lysander]

Day Four: Regrouping.

The required bombing effort for day four had been established prior to the launch of Day Three’s missions. Fortunately, these requirements allowed for the use of only U-Tapao’s B-52Ds. This was done to reduce the flight time (four hours versus twelve) and reduce maintenance requirements, not only of the bombers, but for the tankers that had to launch from Kadena AB in Okinawa and Clark AFB in the Philippines to support large bomber strikes from Andersen. Andersen’s B-52Gs were assigned relatively low SAM threat missions in support of Arc Light, the tactical support bombing missions in South Vietnam, which, incidentally, had been supported in addition to Linebacker II missions by both U-Tapao and Andersen.

The requirements were for a single wave of 30 bombers with each cell attack separated by 60 to 90 seconds instead of two minutes. Commencing at 03:33 am local (0833Z) the first of two cells of B-52D were to bomb the Quang Te air field, followed by 4 cells hitting the Van Dien supply depot, and last, 4 cells were to hit the Bac Mai storage facility. Prior to the B-52 attacks, 15 individual F-111A were scheduled starting at around 5:30 pm local (1030Z).

With the reduced B-52 strikes, the support package was similarly reduced 13 SAM suppression, 23 escort and 9 chaff flights were required. Navy/USMC support amounted to 9 A-6s and 6 A-7s.

The reduced B-52 schedule was partially made up for in heavier and more pin-point fighter bombing that afternoon. 24 A-7Ds and 4 F-4s bombed the Giap Nhi rail road yards, 12 F-4 struck the Duc Noi rail yards, 4 F-4s with Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) were able to knock out the Hanoi electrical power plant, 4 F-4s with LGBs struck the Hanoi rail yards and 4 more F-4s with LGBs knocked out the Hanoi AM radio transmission station. 16 F-4s did a LORAN bomb run over the Trung Quang rail yard, with no observed results.

The B-52 sent this night used a different routes than previous; ingress was still along from the southwest from Thailand and Laos and over “Thud Ridge” but egress was a straight shot over the coast. This was dictated so that egress should be “wet feet” over the Gulf of Tonkin. Another major change was more of the detailed planning was delegated to “Arc Light” staff at Andersen instead of being handled by SAC HQ in Omaha.

The first loss of the evening was a Navy A-6A (Flying Ace 500), which was damaged by AAA bombing the Haiphong Port facilities and went down near Ken An air field. Both pilot and BN were killed.

The first 18 B-52s struck their targets without a hitch. Over Bac Mai, however, two of the big bombers ran into trouble. In the lead cell, Scarlet 01 lead lost their radar, and with no one in front to feed target information, they could not bomb accurately. They attempted to move from the lead position to trail position in the cell, but became separated and lost ECM coverage. They were ineffectively engaged by a MiG-21, then after bomb release were struck by a SAM (the MiG was probably just marking the bomber for a SAM crew). At the tail end of the bomber stream, Blue 01 was salvoed by as many as ten SAMs as they approached the release point. As soon as bombs away was called, two SAMs detonated, one above the cockpit on the co-pilot’s side wounding the pilot, Radar Navigator, Navigator, and EWO. All the crew managed to evacuate the aircraft, but were captured.


Lt Col Gerald Alley
LTCDR Robert S. Graustein
LTCDR Barton Wade
Capt Thomas Bennet
1st LT Joseph Copack

 

[hurryinhoosier]

What is tragic about Linebacker II is the fact it is was based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for neutralizing North Vietnam in 100 days that was submitted to LBJ and McNamara in 1964...

 

[lysander]

What is tragic about Linebacker II is the fact it is was based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for neutralizing North Vietnam in 100 days that was submitted to LBJ and McNamara in 1964...

While large strategic bomber raids would have been impressive, in the sense that it would have impressed on the NV leaders the resolve of the US to win the war, in 1964, it would not have been as effective as it was in late 1972.

The B-52F, the first model assigned to SEA, were not all fitted with external hard points for conventional ordnance, nor did they have the Big Belly conversion. Both the conventional bomb pylons and the Big Belly were brought about by the fact that the F models weren't as effective as, or as efficient as tactical aircraft. Coupled with the fact that B-52 crews were not trained in flying in large formations*. The older D models were converted due to the fact that they were no longer considered front line nuclear capable aircraft, and there were a lot of them, they were the second most numerous model produced, right behind the Gs.

While dropping twenty-seven 750 pound M-117 bombs (the maximum load for a F, G or the current H, without external carriage) all at once, will get your attention, the Big Belly, with 84 bombs internally and 24 bombs externally, could deliver 108 bombs, 4 times as many, inside a box about 1/4 mile long and 200 yards wide.

____________________________________
* On July 19th 1965, the very first Arc Light mission flown resulted in the mid-air collision of two B-52 with the loss of eight crew. Two years later it happened again.

 

[GardenValley]

We never heard the B-52s at Khe Sanh and it seemed a lot of their missions were flown at night. In a dark night you would suddenly see a flash of light when a bomb detonated and that single flash then became a line of light that were successive explosions walking their way up and down the hillsides. Truly an impressive display of firepower and destruction. During the breakout we saw first hand what a B-52 strike looked like on the ground, and we found graves where an NVA soldier was buried and a buddy had fashioned a marker, and though it was written in Vietnamese it was clear his death had been caused by a B-52 strike.

 

[XXIV Corps]

I had witnessed that massive destruction at night more the once during my tours along the DMZ. We would almost come to a complete stand still when the display would catch our attention. While during a fire mission or standing guard duty at night...

In a dark night you would suddenly see a flash of light when a bomb detonated and that single flash then became a line of light that were successive explosions walking their way up and down the hillsides.

and you can feel the ground move beneath your feet when close enough to your FSB.


GI3